Nedim Hogic
The only democracy where anti-corruption standards in the last fifteen years have gone down is the United States. In all other countries, laws were tightened, standards were toughened, and scandals were causing public outrage. However, only in America was it becoming easier to receive donations, lobby for foreign interests, and trade in influence. The Biden administration has, at least in some respects, tried to reverse this trend, but it has not succeeded. They claimed that anti-corruption policies were good for the American middle class, but it turned out that the American middle class didn’t care as long as they could afford to shop at Whole Foods. The sloppy and poorly managed criminal prosecution of Donald Trump served more to shape the narrative about him than to actually obtain a solid criminal conviction. However, the narrative promoted through the media, which constantly featured the same pundits like Andrew Weissmann, did not even penetrate his base, making the entire endeavor counterproductive.
The administration tried to introduce obligations regarding corporate transparency and financial reporting, aiming to better track suspicious transactions and curb money laundering. The changes were slow and obstructed. They tried to limit the opening of shell companies in states like Delaware or Wyoming, making the whole process more transparent but not much less dangerous. They tried to break up the network of oligarchs around Putin, convinced that he was trying to rule the world through them and that, once they were sanctioned, with their assets abroad seized, they would turn their backs on him. The assets were seized, but very few oligarchs turned their back on Putin. Instead, that’s how American oligarchs behaved; once Musk got out in power and started taking revenge for all the evil that, in his opinion, the Democratic administration had done to him, the American oligarchs forgot everything the Democrats did for them.
True, there was some seriousness and a sense of urgency in the effort to prevent unregistered foreign lobbying, and the FARA prosecutions that now seem to be paused (just as some elements of the FCPA enforcement) were uncovering a series of networks engulfing Washington D.C. However, when it comes to foreign lobbying, America has become a victim of its own success. A view from peripheral areas that are geopolitical playgrounds allows one to see it more clearly. In the Balkans, when we talk about lobbying in Washington, we resemble medieval peasants arguing about whom to send to the castle to speak to the feudal lord about how many chickens and eggs we should give this fall.
These lobbying efforts often cancel each other out, but the gifts that are brought do not cancel out but multiply each other. However, faith in the success of lobbying and influence trading in Washington is already taking on the proportions of a cargo cult. The American national interest as a category will be or has aleady been gradually dissolved by the currants of various lobbying efforts that America invites upon itself. And these currants form the vast sea of American foreign policy. Therefore, Elon Musk’s behavior, his global influence trading that seems to have begun a long time ago and is now continuing, should not be seen as a break with the existing tradition, but rather its radicalization and the invitation of its ultimate consequences.
Source: The Telegraph