How Hungary’s EU presidency may affect corruption control in Hungary and the EU
Under the Trumpian slogan Make Europe Great Again! Hungary – ruled by Viktor Orbán and his party FIDESZ since 2010 – took over the rotating EU presidency as of 1 July. Many, including EU officials, politicians, and observers fear this half-year period will yield long-lasting damages. One issue seems particularly vexing: How will the Hungarian presidency affect control of corruption and public integrity within the bloc?
Hungary’s recent record with democracy, rule of law, and corruption is well known and well documented (e.g., here and here). Following the 2010 elections, which resulted in a constitutional majority for Orbán’s Fidesz party, the government initiated the implementation of a self-proclaimed “illiberal” model. This entailed the systematic dismantling of democratic institutions and the marginalization or silencing of the majority of critics. Systemic corruption has been a major factor in this process: the regime has used its power to capture public rents, which in turn has further increased its control over power, creating a vicious circle. Orbán’s allies – including his childhood friend and gas technician Lőrinc Mészáros, and his son-in-law Tiborcz István, both among the wealthiest people in Hungary – have made enormous gains from public procurement contracts (including those funded by the EU) and asserted control over most economic sectors in the country. The investigations launched by the dubious National Sovereignty Protection against Transparency International (TI) Hungary and Átlátszó, an independent watchdog are just the latest in a long series of measures by Orbán aimed at eliminating the remaining constraints on political corruption. The declining state of corruption control and transparency in Hungary is also reflected in TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index (Hungary was ranked the most corrupt country in the EU) and ERCAS’s Index of Public Integrity and Transparency Index (T-index).
With his long record of undermining and blocking EU-level decisions and using his veto to blackmail the EU, fears over his presidency – especially regarding its potential to undermine the EU’s ability to tackle democratic decline and corruption – seem warranted. Yet, he has neither the tools nor the momentum to create much havoc. The rotating EU presidency has limited powers, its main role being facilitating the dialogue and conversation within the EU as an “honest broker” with some leverage over the agenda. This leverage is now lower than usual: Hungary will not preside over key legislative processes, as the new Commission – to be approved by the Parliament after the elections on 9 June – won’t take office until 1 November. The preceding Belgian presidency also made sure to get some sensitive issues done – including opening Ukraine’s accession talks and pushing through sanction packages against Russia– before Hungary assumed the role. Orbán himself has no incentives to create turmoil: too many scandals may backfire and spoil the opportunity to smoothly influence things, Péter Krekó (CEU Democracy Institute) told Politico.
Instead, Orbán may once again walk a thin line with the EU, skillfully playing his cards to tilt things to his advantage while avoiding too much backlash. There are three main ways he may do so. Firstly, the overlap of Hungary’s presidency and the interregnum of the Commission not only limits Orbán’s options to influence the legislative process but also creates a window of opportunity to implement new measures to weaken democratic accountability and enable more corruption in Hungary. In the aftermath of EU elections, characterized by intense negotiations about the top jobs, the vigilance of the EU typically flattens, Kim Scheppele (Princeton University) told The Guardian. Orbán used the periods of his rotating presidency in 2011 and the interregnum after the 2019 elections to pass controversial legislation in Hungary, such as bringing into effect the new constitution, and implementing measures to exert political control over the judiciary and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The coincidence of his presidency with the interregnum may provide him with the optimal opportunity to advance Hungary’s trajectory in a similar direction while avoiding significant repercussions.
Secondly, Orbán can also use his presidency to strengthen his position in the international arena. His increased visibility creates an excellent opportunity to further his ongoing effort of uniting the European far-right and creating a new party in the European Parliament. In the first week of his presidency, Orbán has recently visited Moscow and Beijing amid vivid criticism, as he has sought to position himself as a mediator between the EU and its two main rivals. Orbán also cultivates close ties with Trump. Should Trump be reelected, Orbán can use his presidency to strengthen the relationship. These maneuverings strengthen his position and grant him more leverage in the EU, which he may use to weaken the EU’s control over corruption in Hungary. This may also weigh in the ongoing rule-of-law procedure in the frame of which the Commission is withholding EU funds from Hungary over concerns regarding corruption, rule-of-law, and other issues.
Thirdly, while the agenda-setting power of the rotating EU presidency is limited, it is nevertheless important. The priorities set by the Hungarian presidency mostly seem justified; it is more telling what is missing from them: even though the EU’s anti-corruption directive is currently under negotiation and was to be finalized before 2025, the 44-page-long program of the presidency only mentions corruption once. By delaying the directive, and in a broader sense, shifting the agenda from corruption to other topics, Orbán may further undermine the EU’s ability to tackle corruption.
While these actions primarily affect corruption control in Hungary, they also yield significant consequences at the EU level. The consolidation of Orbán’s position within the EU, coupled with the postponement and/or attenuation of instruments for combating corruption, erodes the bloc’s already constrained capacity to take action against corruption, not only in Hungary but also in other countries. On a related note, Orbán’s success in getting away with the dismantling of democratic institutions and engaging in large-scale corruption sets a dangerous precedent that may encourage current future leaders of other member states with similar ambitions to follow the steps of Orbán.
What shall actors and organizations do to fight corruption in Hungary and elsewhere? While there are no easy and one-fits-all answers, the promotion of transparency is arguably a pivotal first step. Transparency – broadly defined as the availability of public information required to deter corruption and enable public accountability – increases constraints vis-á-vis corruption and decreases resources for corruption. The novel (T-index) developed by ERCAS (to be updated in a few weeks) enables the identification of types of public information that governments fail to provide. Hungary, for instance, does not have an online budget tracker system which would allow citizens and organizations to monitor government expenditures, and point out and raise voices against corrupt expenses. A recent study about Hungary shows that while partisan identities largely influence political behavior, voters also care about substantive matters (e.g., government performance, policy issues, and ideologies). More transparency could, therefore, bring about a stronger pressure by voters on the government to restrict its corrupt dealings.
By Áron Hajnal (ERCAS and Corvinus University of Budapest)