Massimo Privitera
Even though significant advancements have been made in recent years in the realm of objective corruption indicators, there are instances in which these new indicators might be unsuitable to spot corrupt behaviour due to the specificity of the situation under scrutiny. For instance, while the presence of a single bidder in public tendering is often a good indicator that the procedure is at least suspicious, there are instances in which a host of different suppliers can organise to bid for a public contract, even though the outcome of the procedure is unfair. The contract is assigned through corrupt practices. This is especially the case in areas where the host of different suppliers is managed by organized crime.
In the study on “Measurements of Construction-Based Corruption with Satellite Data” by Saverio Di Giorno (University of Pisa), co-authored with Joras Ferwerda (Utrecht University) and Francesco Busato (University of Naples “Parthenope”), a new approach to corruption measurement is proposed, with a specific focus on construction works.
The study explores the hypothesis that inefficient spending in the construction industry due to corruption results in more built-up land surface than what is justified by the area’s actual requirement. It first analyses how much of the built-up land can be explained by geomorphological, demographic, and socio-economic factors, then checks the correlation of the residuals (in this case, the quantity of built-up land that is not explained by the abovementioned factors) with a host of different indicators.
In the case of Italy, indicators of organized crime (e.g., mafia presence Index or number of dissolved municipalities) proved to be significantly correlated with a certain level of variability. In the case of other countries in Europe (i.e., Germany, Spain and France), the study had to overcome the limitations linked to the absence of similar indicators on organised crime and to the different geographical focus of the indicators included in the study as an alternative. However, notwithstanding the limitations, a significant correlation was found with some of those indicators (e.g., good public spending index).
In a nutshell, the study provides a complementary approach to spot corruption in public tendering for construction works that could potentially highlight corrupt practices when other indicators (e.g., Public Procurement Indicators) could be unsuitable to do so due to the specific situation under scrutiny.
Here is Saverio Di Giorno’s presentation of the study, followed by a discussion of the findings with Lucio Picci (University of Bologna).
Source: ISHN