A new paper by Adam Holesch and the IBEI-BridgeGap team follows the positions of Russia of European parties.
In the early phase of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, political unity in the European Parliament reached unusually high levels. Supporting Ukraine became the dominant norm, and deviating from it carried significant reputational and electoral costs.
However, domestic politics shape war narratives. Whether a party governs or sits in opposition appears to influence how strongly it mobilizes war fatigue and challenges mainstream pro-Ukraine positions. As war fatigue has grown and domestic debates over the costs of supporting Ukraine have intensified, new political opportunities have opened up — especially for populist radical right (PRR) actors.
What is becoming increasingly clear is that the European far right is far from ideologically unified. While these parties once found common ground in opposing liberal norms on migration, gender, and minority rights, Russia’s war has exposed deep internal fractures. Some PRR parties portray Russia as a conservative “civilizational ally,” while others see it as a direct security threat or even an imperial aggressor.
While all these positions may simply reflect the beliefs of their holders, to which they are entitled, of course, we are also aware that it is not only Qatar or Morocco who try to acquire influence in the European Parliament — Russia, too.
