A new publication from the BridgeGap consortium examines one of the oldest assumptions in anti-corruption policy: do tougher penalties actually deter corruption, or does effective enforcement depend on something else?
Researchers from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem have published a new article in the Regulation & Governance special issue “Efforts to Map and Control Corruption”, contributing to BridgeGap’s broader effort to strengthen the evidence base on anti-corruption governance.
In “Certainty, Severity, or Celerity? A Mixed-Effects Analysis of Corruption and Deterrence in the European Union“, Eran Itskovich, Roni Factor, David Levi-Faur, Justice Tankebe, and Ina Kubbe investigate how different dimensions of deterrence relate to corruption across Europe.
The study revisits the three classic pillars of deterrence theory:
- Certainty – the likelihood that corrupt behaviour will be detected and punished;
- Severity – how harsh the punishment is;
- Celerity – how quickly justice is delivered.
While these concepts have long informed anti-corruption policies, empirical evidence comparing their effects has remained limited. Previous research has focused largely on laboratory experiments and has paid relatively little attention to the role of timely enforcement.
To address these gaps, the authors analyse longitudinal data from 25 European Union countries covering the period 2013–2024. Using mixed-effects models, they examine how the three dimensions of deterrence interact with broader political, economic, and social factors, including levels of trust.
The findings challenge the assumption that harsher sanctions are the key to reducing corruption.
The analysis shows that certainty of punishment is consistently associated with lower levels of corruption, whereas the severity of punishment alone is not. Perhaps most importantly, certainty only appears to matter when enforcement is also timely. Where judicial processes are slow, increasing the perceived likelihood of punishment has little observable relationship with corruption. When cases are resolved more quickly, however, the deterrent effect becomes substantially stronger.
These results suggest that strengthening anti-corruption enforcement is not simply a matter of introducing tougher penalties. Improving the efficiency and responsiveness of justice systems may be just as important—if not more so—for making enforcement credible.
The article also contributes methodologically by integrating all three dimensions of deterrence within a single empirical framework and testing them using real-world longitudinal data rather than experimental settings. In doing so, it provides new evidence on how criminal justice institutions influence corruption in practice.
The publication forms part of BridgeGap’s wider research agenda on understanding what works in anti-corruption policy. By moving beyond assumptions and testing competing explanations with comparative evidence, the project seeks to support better-informed policymaking across Europe and beyond.
The article is available open access in Regulation & Governance:
Itskovich, E., Factor, R., Levi-Faur, D., Tankebe, J., & Kubbe, I. (2026). Certainty, Severity, or Celerity? A Mixed-Effects Analysis of Corruption and Deterrence in the European Union.